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Budget Deficits, Interest Rates, and the Dollar
Last fall, short-term interest rates dropped about
3 percentage points, and long-term rates fell
around 2 percentage points. With the rate of
inflation staying low, this translated intoequiv-
alent declines in real, or inflation-adjusted,
interest rates. A widely held view is that lower
U.S. real interest rates should depress the real
value of the u.s. dollar, but the real trade-
weighted valueofthe dollarappreciated another
10 percent overthe same period. Also puzzling is
the factthatthe decline in real interest rates
occurred even though the u.s. federal budget
deficit (on a cyclically adjusted basis) continued
to grow. This Letter argues that the explanation
for these two puzzles is to be found in the
economy's longer-term adjustmentto persistently
large federal budgetdeficits.
Interest rate differentials and the dollar
A widely accepted view ofexchange rate deter-
mination is the theory of interest parity which
holds that the value ofthe dollar(or any other
currency) is dominated bythe effects ofactual
and potential flows ofcapital. In particular, the
dollar's value will tend to be such that the total
expected return on dollar-denominated assets
just equals the total expected return on foreign-
currency-denominated assets, plus or minus a
premium to compensate for differences in risk.
The expected returns include notonlythe pure
interest returns, butalso the expected capital
gains or losses arising from anticipated changes
in currency values.
The theory of interest parity thus implies that the
value ofthe dollarshould be bid to the point
where its expected future depreciation or appre-
ciation over any given period approximately
equals the difference between the interest yields
on U.S. and foreign investments with maturities
ofthat same period. When this condition is met,
the total expected return on investments at home
will be approximately the same as thaton invest-
ments abroad.
In influencing the exchange rate, the differential
between domestic and foreign long-term interest
rates should dominate. The difference between
short-term rates matters onlyto the extentthat it
affectsthedifferential between long-term rates. For
example, ifthe interest rate on 1-year U.S. bonds
goes upone percentage pointand this increase is
expected to be temporary, the interest rate on 10-
year U.S. bonds should rise onlyone-tenth ofone
percentage point. Given foreign interest rates, the
valueofthe dollarwould then rise one percentage
pointto set up an expected depreciation of 1 per-
centoverthe following year, and thereby equalize
total expected returns over all investmentperiods.
However, ifthe increase in the 1-year u.s. interest
rate is expected to last for 10 years, the interestrate
on 10-year U.S. bonds would rise by 1 percentage
point; and the valueofthedollarwouldthen rise 10
percentto equalize total expected returns.
It is easily shown that an identical relationship
oughtto hold between the expected future depre-
ciation or appreciation in the real value ofthe
dollar and the differential between real long-term
interest rates.
Thus, given an expected real value for the dollar
in the future, the dollar's current real value
should move in the same direction as the differ-
ential between domestic and foreign real long-
term interest rates. The difference between U.S.
and foreign real long-term interest rates did track
the real value ofthe dollarquitewell up until the
end of 1982, as shown in Chart 1. This suggests
thatthe expected real value ofthe dollarwas
relatively stable until the beginningof 1983,
when the relationship between the long-term
interest rate differential and the dollar's value
began to break down. The real long-term interest
rate differential dropped sharply at thattime, but
the real value ofthe dollarsoon reached new
highs.
Another element in the dollar's strength
The continuing appreciation ofthe dollar, despite
a declining real interest rate differentia" suggests
that the expected real value ofthe dollarbegan to
rise significantly after 1982. This development
constitutes a second stage in the adjustmentof
the economy to persistently large federal budget
deficits.FRBSF
From 1979 through early 1982, U.S. real interest
rates rose because ofthe slowing in monetary
growth required to bring inflation undercontrol.
Butthen, in late 1982 and 1983, real interest rates
failed to return to normal levels primarilybecause
ofthe tax cuts provided over athree year period
by the Economic Recovery and Tax Act of 1981.
These contributed to large budget deficits that put
substantial upward pressure on U.S. credit mar-
kets and thus on real interest rates. Duringthe
first stage ofadjustment to these large budget
deficits, occurring roughly until mid-1983, high
real interest rates bid the real value ofthe dollar
high enough above its expected future level to
make the implicitexpected depreciation in the
future offset the attraction ofthe high real interest
returns here relative to those abroad.
In the second and current stage ofadjustment,
such a largedollardepreciation is nolongerexpec-
ted becausethe persistenceoflargefederal budget
deficits is leading to upward revisions in the mar-
ket's expectation ofthe future real value ofthe
dollar. The market has received new information
indicating thatthe U.S. federal budget deficitwill,
at best, be reduced only gradually. Furthermore,
international capital markets are quite efficient,
and, as a resuIt, mostofthebudgetdeficithas been
financed eitherdirectlyorindirectlyby netcapital
inflows. Because the expenditure effects ofthe
budgetdeficit are notgenerating an offsetting
decrease in the trade balance, permanently larger
netcapital inflows must lead to an appreciation of
the dollarthatwill create a larger volumeof
imports compared to exports, thereby balancing
the supply and demand for dollars in the market
for foreign exchange. Thus, the expectation that
stronger net capital inflowswill continue because
ofpersistently largefederal budgetdeficits is lead-
ing the market to raise its expectation ofthe real
value ofthe dollar in the future.
Current indications are that a substantial increase
in the market's expected real value ofthe dollar
already has occurred. This change in expectations
is oneofthe key elements in the second stage of
the economy's adjustmentto the shift in U.S.
fiscal policy towards larger budgetdeficits. Even
with lower U.S. real interest rates, the total antici-
pated return on U.S. assets is no lowerthan in the
first stage because the dollar is now anticipated to
depreciate less in the future.
Another factor adding strength to the dollar is
indicated in Chart 2, which shows that atthe
same time that the U.S. budgetwas moving into
deficit, government budgets in the other major
GECD countries were movingtoward surpluses.
This sustained shift in foreign fiscal policies is
generating permanently higher levels of national
saving abroad, which also contribute to expecta-
tions ofpersistently higher net capital inflows into
the United States, lendingeven more strength to
the dollar.
Implication for real interest rates
The other key element in the economy's longer-
run adjustmentto budget deficits is the lag in the
response ofexports and imports to the real value
ofthe dollar. As shown in Chart 3, during the first
stage ofadjustment in 1982 and 1983, the struc-
tural budget deficitgrew faster than the excess of
imports over exports. This, alongwith the recov-
ery from the 1981-82 recession, kept real interest
rates relatively high. At that stage, the dollarwas
strengthened mainly by a high real interest rate
differential in favor ofthe United States that offset
an expected dollar depreciation. But because it
takes over ayear for the exchange rate to make its
full impactfelt on net exports, there was rela-
tively little drag on overall aggregate demand
from a larger deficit in the foreign sector. The
pressure on real interest rates from the budget
deficits was therefore large in comparison to that
occurring in the second stage ofadjustment.
During the second stage, beginning in mid-1983,
netexports fell faster than the structural budget
deficitgrew, as the stronger dollartook its fu II
effect. The deterioration in the foreign sector
contributed importantly to the slowdown in real
economic growth duringthe last halfof 1984,
which, in turn, caused real interest rates to
decline. Also, the value ofthe dollar at this stage
came to be strengthened more by heightened
expectations ofthe effects ofcontinued budget
deficits on international capital flows, than by
high real interest rates.
Conclusion
In summary, so far there have been two distinct
stages in the adjustment ofthe economy to
persistently large federal budgetdeficits. During
the first stage, up until around mid-1983, large
budget deficits were perceived to be relativelyChart 1
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temporary, and thedollar's strength atthat time
resulted mainlyfrom higher real interest rates that
counterbalanced an expecteddollardepreciation.
The economy could withstand these high real
interest rates because their depressing effect on
aggregate demand was being offset bythe stim-
ulus from the budgetdeficit itself, and also
because the strong dollar had not yet fully
affected net exports.
In the second stage, which we are still in, the
dollar has remained strong despite a reduction in
the differential between domestic and foreign real
long-term interest rates because ofan increased
market perception that persistently large budget
deficits at home and smaller ones abroad will
generate permanently larger netcapital inflows.
These larger capital inflows will necessitate a
strongerdollartocreatean offsettingdecline in net
exports, thereby balancing the supply and
demandfordollars. As the market'sexpectation of
the real value ofthe dollar in the future rises, the
current real value is pulled along. Also, as the
effectofthe strong dollar on netexports, and
henceon overall aggregate demand, becomes
more fullyfelt, real interest rates mustdecline.
Foreign investors eventually mightcome to feel
relatively satiated with dollar-denominated
investments and require a substantially higher
real interest rate differential. As the perceived risk
premium for investing in dollarassetsrises, the
differential in total returns (i.e., includingthe risk
premium) would fall, thus tendingto weaken the
real value ofthe dollar and raise U.S. real interest
rates. Such a development would constitute yet a
third stage in the economy's adjustmentto persis-
tently large U.S. budget deficits. However, cur-
rent indications are that this stage is at least
several years off. In the meantime, there is good
reason to believe thatthe dollarwill remain
strong despite substantially reduced levels ofreal
interest rates.
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 188,322 145 10,517 5.9
Loans and Leases1 6 170,622 578 13,011 8.2
Commercial and Industrial 52,760 311 5,805 12.3
Real estate 62,252 20 2,598 4.3
Loans to Individuals 32,716 174 5,683 21.0
Leases 5,275 6 268 5.3
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,584 - 426 - 1,635 - 13.4
Other Securities2 7,076 - 7 - 855 - 10.7
Total Deposits 192,331 -2,291 6,298 3.4
Demand Deposits 43,689 -2,335 - 526 - 1.2
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 28,851 625 153 .5
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,755 - 168 732 6.0
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,886 211 6,097 4.7
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 43,783 69 3,410 8.4
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 39,173 - 207 1,012 2.6
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 21,049 1,094 737 3.6
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (- )
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change